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Introduction
The special circumstances of the violent death of the Freiburg student 
and the origin of the underage suspect from the Middle East gave rise to 
demands by the police and politicians to use expanded possibilities of fo-
rensic DNA analysis. Such analyses can help to make assessments about 
the appearance and origin of an unknown possible perpetrator, which 
can be used by the police for their criminal investigation work.
(Opinion of the German Trace Commission on the 
possibilities and limits of the DNA-based inference 
of external body features, the biogeographical origin 
and the age of unknown persons based on 
crime scene traces in the context of police investigations, 
from 14 December 2016, GEDNAP 2016)
The Freiburg rape and murder – which the quotation above is referring to – 
took place in the autumn of 2016 and sparked a public debate in Germany 
about introducing and regulating forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) tech-
nologies. FDP assembles a set of technologies geared towards inferring 
externally visible characteristics from DNA traces found at crime scenes, 
which then provide investigative leads in the criminal investigation based 
on the inference of human externally visible traits such as eye, hair and skin 
colour, as well as biological age and, potentially, biogeographic ancestry. 
Right after the murder of the student Maria L., FDP was presented by pol-
icymakers as a solution to the type of case that involved an asylum seeker 
from Afghanistan, and to make criminal investigation processes overall 
more efficient. Critical commentators perceived FDP technologies as a 
highly risky technology, with the potential to threaten privacy rights and to 
discriminate against minority groups.
In December 2019, some of those FDP technologies were legalised for 
criminal investigation on the federal level in Germany: namely the inference 
of external visible characteristics such as eye, hair and skin colour, as well as 
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the biological age of an unknown criminal suspect; the inference of biogeo-
graphic ancestry was not included. In 2018, Bavaria, one of the 16 states of 
Germany, additionally already had included the inference of biogeographic 
ancestry in the set of techniques available for police work. They legalised 
its use in specific situations of “imminent danger” (which can be regulated 
on the state level in parallel to the federal level). The public controversy 
that accompanied the regulation process of the FDP innovation took place 
in times of increasing xenophobia, racism and right-wing extremism. From 
its very outset, the proposal for regulating FDP technologies was entan-
gled with expectations, estimations and conciliations about the potentially 
harmful impact of FDP technologies on marginalised communities. The 
debate mobilised resentment against migrant minorities that was reinforced 
in the context of the immigration situation following the “summer of mi-
gration” in 2015 and within the wider societal climate after the reported 
sexual assaults events in Cologne in 2016. The climate had changed from 
the much anticipated German “Willkommenskultur” (welcoming culture) 
and turned into discussions about the dangers of “political correctness” and 
“too liberal” immigration policies (Boulila and Carri 2017). Since then “un-
acknowledged racisms” accompanied public and policy debates involving 
migrant issues (ibid).
Police spokespersons, single policymakers and forensic geneticists joined 
together, calling for using available but not yet legalised technologies. Civil 
society and academics from diverse disciplines began warning of the poten-
tial harm of these technologies, emphasising, in particular, the potential for 
discrimination, stigmatisation and racism caused by the exposure of FDP 
technologies to minority groups (Lipphardt 2018). For long, public percep-
tions regarding genetics in Germany were still influenced by memories of 
Germany’s Nazi past and of how science was used in racialising genetics and 
the eugenics movement (Kattmann 2017). Germany’s past has contributed 
to a strong sense of privacy regarding genetics and a general suspicion of 
state actors accessing sensitive genetic information and was also dominant 
when regulators decided in favour of establishing the DNA database in 1998 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1995; Lee 2016, 216).
Over time, diverse stakeholders ranging from forensic geneticists to 
civil society groups called for varied safeguards – proposing limiting its 
use to severe crimes or training criminal justice actors to prevent racial 
 discrimination – to achieve acceptable and accountable technologies. Those 
calls have not been taken into account by the legislator. The German regula-
tory process of FDP technologies sparked my interest as it looks to be a case 
of smoothly introducing controversial technologies in a political- cultural 
context that is overall sensitised for risks of racial discrimination, in par-
ticular entangled with genetics. Furthermore, viewpoints deriving from 
justified concerns about risks and the potential harm of FDP technologies 
seem to be easily disregarded and ruled out.
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The chapter explores how knowledge politics shape ways of public legit-
imate knowledge-making about FDP technologies, demonstrating FDP’s 
techno-scientific utility to specific publics while segregating them from 
other affected publics. The term “affected publics” builds on the pragma-
tist philosopher John Dewey’s famously proposed definition: “The pub-
lic consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of 
human action, to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those 
consequences systematically cared for” (Dewey 1927, 15). Dewey’s take on 
the affected public attracted significant interest from scholars in Science 
and Technology Studies in exploring technologies’ consequences on pub-
lics, and, in particular, the processes of problematisation and their material 
entanglements that bring about publics (Marres and Lezaun 2011; Marres 
2012; Dijstelbloem and Broeders 2015). I argue that knowledge politics pri-
oritising some forms of knowing FDP over others also prioritise knowledge 
about consequences on publics. I take inspiration from Sheila Jasanoff’s 
recent work on the politics of public knowing and the diverse regimes of 
sight (Jasanoff 2017). Jasanoff identified three different modes of authorised 
seeing that render data both visible and actionable, while, at the same time, 
constructing “invisibilities” and different viewpoints of public knowing. 
She called them the views from nowhere, everywhere and somewhere, which 
come with their mechanisms of legitimation, including discourses of valid 
seeing and practices of consensus building. I ask here, rephrasing Jasanoff 
(2017): What are different modes of knowing the consequences of FDP tech-
nologies for imaginaries of the affected publics? Whose knowing and view-
point count, under which rules of the game and what gets relegated to the 
margins of invisibility and inaction?
The analytical perspective inspired by Jasanoff’s regimes of sight help us 
understand the knowledge politics entangled with FDP technologies that 
favour some forms of authorised knowing and marginalise other forms, in-
cluding forms of knowing about assumed risks and potential harm for spe-
cifically affected publics. I explore different modes of knowing about FDP, 
and how they are entangled with value commitments and implications for 
imagining affected publics. However, as Jasanoff’s work does not consider 
how knowing may be entangled with strategic ignorance of other modes of 
knowing, I pay particular attention to how modes of knowing different from 
authorised forms become relegated (McGoey 2012; Aradau 2017). Further-
more, I delve into specific the politics of (non)belonging, which establish and 
manifest visibilities and actionability about some suspicious criminalised 
phenotypic and genetic minorities while downgrading or ruling out certain 
modes of knowing and concerns about the risk of racialised discrimination 
entangled with FDP technologies.
I analyse policy documents from regulators as well as regulatory con-
sultation opinions and interviews with stakeholders engaged with these 
technologies. The chapter then reconstructs the diverse viewpoints deriving 
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from different modes of public knowing, which accompanied the regulation 
process of these technologies. Multiple affected publics are imagined when 
FDP technologies become configured as technologies of othering, marking 
differences between “us” and “them,” sorting out specific “risky” people 
with different appearances. The analysis reveals particular politics of be-
longing by imagining specific publics as benefitting from the technologies 
in the name of security and other publics as potentially being harmed by 
generalised suspicion.
The chapter is broken down into four sections. It begins by portraying the 
German process of public discourse on the regulation of FDP as a case of 
pondering and negotiating the technology’s proportionality, appropriate-
ness and public legitimacy to protect society from crime and at the same 
time to prevent the harmful application of the technologies on specific pop-
ulation groups. Subsequently, the chapter assembles building blocks for an 
analytical heuristic on enacting imaginaries of affected publics as the poli-
tics of (non)belonging. Therefore, it critically discusses and advances Jasa-
noff’s recent work on the struggles between different “regimes of sight” and 
the politics of public knowing. Additionally, it mobilises conceptual insights 
from Nira Yuval-Davis’ politics of non-belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006). The 
third section focuses on methodology, followed by the empirical analysis of 
different modes of public knowing of FDP revealing different viewpoints 
and modes of seeing the consequences of FDP together with imaginaries of 
affected publics. Additionally, the analysis identifies forms of the politics 
of (non)belonging in the context of FDP technologies that make specific 
imaginaries of affected publics visible and enact and manifest these imagi-
naries in public debate. Finally, I reflect on the entanglement of the politics 
of (non)belonging with modes of knowing and seeing FDP’s consequences 
for affected publics.
Modes of knowing technology’s consequences and 
enacting imaginaries of affected publics
Dewey’s take on the affected public attracted significant interest from schol-
ars in STS in exploring technologies’ consequences on publics (Dijstelbloem 
and Broeders 2015), the processes of problematisation and their material en-
tanglements, which bring about publics (Marres and Lezaun 2011; Marres 
2012), as well as how affected publics are the contingent outcome of (non)par-
ticipation itself (Chilvers and Kearnes 2020). This chapter develops further 
the notion of imaginaries of affected publics as enacted in views and discourses 
about forensic genetics innovations and which estimate legitimate technolo-
gies’ consequences of potential harm and benefits for specific publics.
The interest in imaginaries of affected publics takes inspiration from Ez-
rahi’s thinking on imaginaries of democracies (Ezrahi 2012),1 in the sense 
that imaginaries are understood as the latent collective imaginations that 
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generate ever-changing concepts of legitimate power and authority, which 
compete for enactment and institutionalisation in the political arena and 
beyond. This notion of imaginaries has received major attention via Jasa-
noff and Kim’s (2015) work on socio-technical imaginaries that decouple 
imaginaries of democracy in Ezrahi’s interpretation from its political philo-
sophical context and broaden it towards contexts of science and technology 
in democratic societies.
In the case of FDP technologies in Germany, the people affected by their 
materialised de facto consequences are yet to be identified once the technol-
ogies have been implemented over some time. But already, in the process 
of emerging, the technology becomes the subject of negotiation in terms of 
its harm and benefits throughout the regulation process, the technology’s 
potential to affect specific publics in particular ways was assumed as being 
most harmful in the form of discriminating against minority groups (Weitz 
and Buchanan 2017; Lipphardt 2018; Wienroth 2020). Yet, some forensic ge-
neticists, policymakers and police forces countered that the technology is 
not harmful and stigmatising per se and that its cautious use and implemen-
tation needs to be ensured and measured to prevent discrimination.
Ruha Benjamin (2019), reflecting on the US context, has explored a range 
of discriminatory designs of new technologies that encode but replicate ex-
isting inequities of racialised legacies. She identifies different forms of dis-
criminatory designs, including explicitly amplifying racial hierarchies in 
technology design, reproducing existing inequities by ignoring social divi-
sions, and aggravating racial bias in an effort to technologically fix it. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to review comprehensively German racial-
ised legacies. But most obviously from its history of race science and eugen-
ics, particularly in the 20th century, to the criminalisation of migrants after 
the summer of migration 2015 in the 21st century, various discriminatory 
systems in different eras have produced and reproduced social divisions 
and inequities, producing wider ecologies for the politics of belonging and 
non-belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006).
Exploring the different assumptions about potential harm and benefits 
for specific publics in justifying the support for or rejection of FDP technol-
ogies, reveals – or so goes my hypotheses – latent and implicit imaginaries 
of segregated affected publics, partially replicating inequities of other eras, 
most often of binary nature (minority versus majority, suspicious versus 
non-suspicious, rare appearance characteristics/biogeographic origin ver-
sus frequent appearance characteristics/biogeographic origin), typifying 
one public against the background of another, etc. In that sense, these imag-
inaries assemble – as I further develop my argument – diverse interdepend-
ent signifiers of belonging and non-belonging that are enacted discursively 
and may stick to the early technology, thereby contributing once more to 
becoming part of wider cultural repertoires as ecologies for the politics of 
belonging and non-belonging.
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Jasanoff’s early work on using political cultures of public knowing to 
study what she calls civic epistemologies (Jasanoff 2005) has helped apply 
country- and culture-sensitive approaches to understanding the political- 
cultural repertoires of legitimacy creating public knowledge around foren-
sic DNA databasing and forensic genetic technology innovations (Amelung 
et al. 2017, 2020).
Jasanoff explored the heuristic of civic epistemologies to refer to ways and 
practices of public knowledge that are culturally specific, historically and 
politically grounded, and which are used as a basis for making collective 
choices (2005). In an earlier contribution (Amelung et al. 2017), we adjust 
the heuristic to explore the current status of forensic genetics surveillance 
societies and demonstrate its utility in analysing the specific situated public 
ethical and democratic perceptions of risk and benefits. Thereby, we suggest 
expanding the focus and integrating the ethical debate in an STS-inspired 
view on the democratic challenges of forensic genetic surveillance. Such an 
angle opens the perspective to reflecting on the knowledge flows that foster 
forensic genetic innovations and shape their public acceptance, and expand 
on questions such as: What are legitimate forms of public knowledge pro-
duction in forensic genetics? How is the epistemic authority of knowledge 
claims achieved in collectives and how does it influence the shape of forensic 
technologies in an accountable manner? And, how can such DNA technolo-
gies and forensic DNA databases be regulated in democratically responsible 
ways?
Jasanoff (2006) argues that science and technology in liberal democra-
cies are meant to serve the public and are enacted in ways that demonstrate 
their credibility and utility to their spectators, the citizens (with particular 
ways of public knowledge-making, forms to gain public accountability and 
demonstration practices). Yet, the relationships between science/technol-
ogy and society are ambiguous. In particular, biological sciences, which are 
foundational for biotechnology as well as for forensic genetics, are used as 
instruments of governance, helping sort and classify people according to 
standardised physical, mental, or social characteristics. Thus, science has 
specific practices that can be used to construct objectivity, expertise and the 
visibility of expert bodies. The implicit dominant notion is that represent-
ative governments can anticipate their citizens’ needs and facilitate science 
and technology for the benefit of their interests.
The widely acknowledged strength of Jasanoff’s concept of civic episte-
mologies is that it may help to understand very general patterns of political 
cultures and their specific characteristics derived from stylised, culturally 
legitimated approaches to producing public facts and public reason. How-
ever, the concept leaves us with two shortcomings. First, we remain poorly 
equipped to understand the situated heterogeneous views, perspectives 
and public knowings of sub-collectives within the wider political cultures 
of public knowing. The interest in patterns of large collectives tends to 
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foreground commonalities of such collectives and shared public knowing 
that features the authoritative and dominating epistemic claims and forms 
of public reason. To be attentive to the multiple claims and forms of pub-
lic knowledge-making entangled with technological change – including 
those that do not gain epistemic authority, and also do not turn into widely 
shared knowledge claims – a consideration of Jasanoff and Kim’s work on 
socio-technical imaginaries (2015) and regimes of sight (Jasanoff 2017) com-
plement the analytical repertoire in a helpful way, as I further outline below.
Second, civic epistemologies as very general patterns of political cultures 
rely on the nation-state as the unit of analysis for comparison to identify char-
acteristics of political cultures distinct in comparison to other nation-state’s 
political cultures. Thereby, the references to “nation” and the “nation-state” 
require additional reflection. Jasanoff reflects on the imagined character of 
nationhood by referencing Anderson (2006) and Ezrahi (1990) and empha-
sises the interest in identifying projects of reimagining nationhood through 
particular episodes and moments of significant scientific and technological 
change. Yet, the focus on patterns of large collectives configuring nation-
hood prioritises widely shared knowledge claims, and thereby configuring 
specific notions of belonging and non-belonging, over marginalised, tacit 
and implicit yet constitutive sub-collective views for re-imagining nation-
hood. Therefore, embracing the politics of belonging and non-belonging in 
a more differentiated manner may help us better understand the dynamics 
of public knowing in the context of emerging technologies entangled with 
racialised discourse in two ways. I suggest they could be explored, first, 
by detecting the diversity of collective views reimagining nationhood, and 
second, by specifying the underlying imaginaries and their particularity of 
segregating affected publics and drawing specific lines of distinction consti-
tuting belonging and non-belonging publics.
The relevance of imaginaries for the politics of belonging and non- 
belonging has been stated by Benedict Anderson in his work on “imagined 
communities” (Anderson 2006). He builds on an abstract sense of imagined 
belonging and in consequence also non-belonging, “because the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Yuval-Davis (2006, p. 204) has promi-
nently clarified how the lines of distinction are drawn: “The boundaries that 
the politics of belonging is concerned with are the boundaries of the political 
community of belonging, the boundaries that separate the world population 
into ‘us’ and ‘them.’” Understanding the dynamics of boundary-making is 
closely linked to a multifaceted understanding of “everyday bordering” 
through ideology, cultural mediation, discourses, political institutions and 
attitudes (Yuval-Davis et al. 2018, p. 229). The authors emphasise that prac-
tices of bordering are “shifting and contested between individuals, group-
ings, and states as well as in the constructions of individual subjectivities” 
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(Yuval-Davis et al. 2018, p. 230). Furthermore, such constructions of bor-
ders are intimately entangled with “specific political projects of belonging, 
which are at the heart of contemporary political agendas” (ibid). I identify 
the emergence and regulation of FDP technologies as part of political pro-
jects of belonging and political agendas in Germany (and elsewhere) com-
mitted to “fear of crime” policies (Hope and Sparks 2012) together with 
the discursive, bureaucratic and technical production of the criminalised 
migrant, the “crimmigrant other” (Franko 2020).
Jasanoff (2017) identified three different modes of seeing with authority 
that render data both visible and actionable. These distinctive modes of col-
lective seeing of data collections are three ideal-typical standpoints from 
which the collection, manipulation, or interpretation of data typically pro-
ceed. She called them the views from nowhere, everywhere and somewhere, 
which come with their mechanisms of legitimation, including discourses of 
valid seeing and practices of consensus building. I propose applying this 
typology of seeing data to DNA data derived from forensic genetics tech-
nologies, in particular FDP. As Jasanoff developed this typology relying on 
global environmental data compilations, it needs two clarifications of what 
“data” refers to in the context of forensic genetics and, more particularly, in 
the case of FDP. Forensic DNA technologies gained high scientific and pub-
lic legitimacy and became “truth machines” (Lynch et al. 2008) understood 
as producing highly reliable and trustworthy results as long as they were 
applied as identification tools, e.g., comparing different DNA profiles and 
analysing if they were from the same person. The technology at stake here 
does not aim at identification but attribution – attribution about the proba-
bilities of specific phenotypical features and, therefore, works with different 
scientific methods. As an emergent technology, the utility still needs to be 
proven in its very specific environment, the forensic culture, e.g., the epis-
temic cultures that collaborate in the context of the criminal justice system 
(Cole 2013). Forensic culture refers to a specific set of relations of epistemic 
authority supporting and supported by several types of knowledge that are 
considered to be of relevance in the social world of forensics. Furthermore, 
its accountability and legitimacy regarding the consequences for affected 
publics and to the constituency in liberal democracies need to be proven 
(Amelung et al. 2020). Data in the context of FDP, therefore, can be under-
stood as the data produced by FDP technologies used to narrow down a 
suspect pool to guide the criminal investigation.
The three modes of seeing differ regarding their standpoints and politics 
(Jasanoff 2017, p. 3). First, a view from nowhere comes with the gaze of sci-
ence as traditionally imagined, as objective, impartial and fact-based, from 
a neutral viewpoint, wherein a human bias is assumed to be absent. Legiti-
macy derives from claims of being outside politics and having mechanisms 
such as peer review in place, which create reliable and accurate knowledge. 
Second, a view from everywhere, instead, comes with the gaze of expert 
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advisory bodies in modern democracies, forms of claiming to cover and 
represent all relevant aspects of the problem, legitimacy is based on aggre-
gating reasoning, and credible and inclusive discourse. Third, a view from 
somewhere comes with the subjective gaze of an eyewitness and is the least 
scientific one. Here, the experienced knower – who might have seen, but 
possibly also was exposed to the consequences of the problem and the acts 
at stake – makes claims in a first-person narrative. Legitimacy here is based 
on genuine experience and authenticity. It may include experiences of per-
sonal injury or damage. Jasanoff’s proposal to apply a differentiated take 
on diverse modes of authorised seeing that make FDP-based data visible 
and actionable allows us to distinguish different viewpoints based on dif-
ferent modes of knowing and epistemic authority. Based on this, I suggest 
imagining differently affected publics, by knowing and assuming differently 
the potential risk of discrimination and racism.
Views from “nowhere,” “everywhere” and 
“somewhere” and the politics of segregating 
imagined affected publics
This chapter is based on a qualitative methodology analysing policy doc-
uments of diverse stakeholders and semi-structured interviews from 
stakeholders. I explored documents from stakeholder organisations, in 
particular, the advisory opinions they provided on the draft law before its 
finalisation, which was in December 2019. Many of those were invited by 
the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection and were made 
public through the ministry. However, my search was complemented by 
reading uninvited advisory opinions that were published in autumn 2019 by 
different stakeholders. As the regulation of FDP was part of a big package 
of police regulations not all available advisory opinions from stakeholders 
address FDP. The selected advisory opinions provide a wide range of sup-
portive and critical views regarding the legalisation of FDP.
The official stakeholder advisory opinions are non-anonymised and need 
to be understood in the context of the articulation of public statements and 
positioning aiming to influence the policy discourse and the final legislation. 
In contrast, the additional interview material is anonymised and needs to 
be contextualised as background reflections, which occasionally go beyond 
publicly performed positioning. Therefore, the interview material provides 
complementary and contextualising insights into the politics of seeing and 
knowing the publics affected by FDP technologies. The semi-structured in-
terviews were conducted between June 2017 and May 2018. Five of those 
with stakeholders in Germany I decided to use for the analysis here. I se-
lected interviewees based on the search of German authors of scientific arti-
cles in the area of FDP, additional contacts with professionals participating 
in conferences and other events relevant to the field, and complemented the 
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selection with the snowball method applied among interviewees, asking for 
forensic geneticists with a known viewpoint on the matter of FDP technol-
ogies. While the sample does not represent the whole range of stakeholder 
views involved in the public discourse, it is sufficiently diverse to represent a 
variety of views and values, as well as types of expertise. The analysis comes 
in two parts, the first analyses the materials that are available as explicit 
public statements from stakeholders related to the draft law on FDP pre-
sented in 2019, which are considered to rely particularly on making claims 
to be considered publicly legitimate. The second part of the analysis is in re-
gards to the semi-structured interviews undertaken with stakeholders who 
engaged with the regulatory process between 2016 and 2019, and which pro-
vide additional in-depth views on sensitive and controversial issues such as 
discrimination and racism.
Modes of “knowing” and “imagining” those 
affected by the consequences of FDP technologies
We can identify three different standpoints relying on different modes of 
making public knowledge, imagining and framing differently who would 
be affected by the consequences of FDP technologies when drawing lines of 
distinction between affected publics.
First, views from forensic genetics considered as the major science behind 
FDP technologies represent “views from nowhere” (Jasanoff 2017), e.g., 
ideal-type views from science assumed to be outside of politics. Forensic 
geneticists’ views had received substantial attention in the media and policy 
discourse about the regulation of FDP and its use in criminal cases. From 
the beginning of the discourse until the very last moment that the legislation 
was debated in the German parliament, “science” was referred to as pro-
viding the reliability needed to ensure objective and valid technologies and, 
thus, accuracy became a value signifying legitimate knowledge to be taken 
into account (GEDNAP 2016). German state authorities asserted that their 
legislative deliberations were informed by expertise-based considerations 
and recent scientific findings: “According to current scientific knowledge, the 
externally visible body characteristics can be determined by examining genetic 
information with sufficient predictive accuracy” (own translation, Bunde-
sministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2019).
As a consequence, “accuracy” renders data produced by FDP technol-
ogies safe and reliable, and co-produces imaginaries of affected publics, 
which should be those suspect populations that are targeted for a good rea-
son. “Predictive accuracy” then also constitutes the notion that the publics 
other than those legitimately targeted should not be affected.
Yet, regarding predictive accuracy, forensic geneticists have repeatedly 
stressed the technical differences in type, scope and informative value of 
the three genetically determined properties that FDP technologies aim to 
predict (external body features, the so-called biogeographical origin and 
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the age of an unknown person). They have been cautious to disclose the dif-
ferent reliabilities and statistically derived probabilities of each technology. 
Prioritising the value of scientific accuracy, the inference of biogeographic 
origin is considered the most reliable, with the highest probability value in 
comparison to the other technologies. Based on meaningful and forensi-
cally validated DNA tests, forensic geneticists presume themselves to be 
able to predict whether a person originates from Europe, Africa, East Asia, 
Oceania or America (here the Indigenous population) with a probability of 
over 99.9% (GEDNAP 2016). At the lower end of accuracy, in contrast, on 
average, the predictions are said to be only correct 75% of the time, with 
black hair being 87% and blond hair only 70% (ibid).
Forensic geneticists’ views articulated through different disciplinary 
organisations had been in favour of the inclusion of biogeographic ances-
try. “Accuracy” was seen as the legitimacy-signifying framing of forensic 
genetic technologies, promoting the reliability and objectivity of scientific 
knowledge behind FDP technologies. As the federal draft law was published 
and did not include the inference of biogeographic ancestry – although it 
was considered the most accurate facet of the technology by the epistemic 
 community – German forensic geneticist organisations expressed their opin-
ion explicitly arguing in favour of including biogeographic ancestry as well:
We strongly recommend, however, making an addition concerning the 
prediction of the so-called biogeographic ancestry (BGA). The (sub-)
continental origin of a person (e.g., Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
East Asia, South Asia and the Indigenous populations in Oceania and 
America) can be predicted with high reliability based on specific DNA 
features.
(own translation, advisory opinion, German Society for Forensic 
Medicine [DGRM], the DGRM working group University 
Forensic Genetics and the German-speaking working group of the 
International Society for Forensic Genetics [ISFG] 2019)
Reacting to and anticipating possible criticism linked to racism and ethnic 
discrimination, forensic geneticists have tried to draw lines of distinction 
between biogeographical descriptors deriving from the prediction of bio-
geographical ancestry, and ethnicity and race as cultural and traditional 
concepts:
Biogeographic ancestry does not in any way correspond to such con-
cepts as ethnic origin or “race”; ethnicity and “race” are shaped by a 
multitude of factors that are not genetic. For the same reason, bioge-
ographic ancestry cannot be equated with language, religion, or other 
manifestations of culture or tradition. It solely concerns the geographi-
cal region(s) from which a person’s biological ancestors originated.
(Schneider et al. 2019, p. 877)
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The technology to predict the biogeographic ancestry provides a glance at 
how population groups become considered as distinguished along the genet-
ically identified continental origin of persons. However, these assertions of 
accurate, reliable technologies that build on objective, scientific knowledge, 
on the one hand, and boundary-making to decouple FDP technologies from 
the assumption of racism built into the technologies, on the other, seem to 
command public trust from some, but not from others.
Second, the consultation process of the federal government attempted to 
assemble diverse stakeholders’ views on the draft law version. Therefore, the 
consultation process is assumed to provide the range of expert advice that 
Jasanoff referred to as “views from everywhere,” the expert advice invited 
as a form of representing diverse affected positions and providing author-
ised knowledge through the logic of plausible reasoning. From the opinions 
articulated through the consultation process, I pick here selected state-
ments from criminal justice actors’ associations – criminal investigators, 
judges and lawyers – to typify additional imaginaries of affected publics of 
those professionals working with FDP technologies. To understand their 
positioning towards forensic science technologies, it is important to situate 
the criminal justice system in a specific context of what Simon Cole calls 
“forensic culture.” Cole (2013, p. 42) considers the criminal justice system 
as extremely welcoming to forensic science methods and results, with no 
commitment to the “principle of organized skepticism, with no technical 
ability to scrutinize or question methods or results, which views forensic 
science as an extremely useful tool with which to further their own goals of 
efficiently delivering justice.” Although there is a multiplicity of different 
and contradictory views regarding technologies and forms of prioritising 
different imaginaries of affected publics, those views all argue within the 
same criminal justice logic of reasoning.
Among them, the Association of German Criminal Investigators artic-
ulated its support for FDP technologies. It comes as no surprise that the 
police welcome additional tools that are assumed to benefit the criminal 
investigation process. Cole (2013, p. 42) stated that police are inclined to 
view and use forensic results as helpful for building a case but, therefore, 
also might be rather uncritical about forensic results presented to them, in-
cluding the potential harm. The support of FDP technologies is legitimised 
and normalised through sequating such technologies with other already es-
tablished criminal investigation tools (ranging from photographs to mass 
screening). Thereby, the potentially assumed risks focusing on the issue of 
privacy became relativised:
The expansion of the possibilities for DNA analysis required by the 
BDK (Association of German Criminal Investigators) at an earlier 
point in time is harmless and can be seen on any photo of the person 
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concerned at any time. It only affects the external features that everyone 
sees and are also not attributable to privacy.
(own translation, advisory opinion, Association of 
German Criminal Investigators 2019)
Furthermore, the association’s statement frames FDP technologies as po-
tentially protecting the rights of wrongfully suspected persons:
The extension also protects the fundamental rights of other people, as it 
may no longer be necessary to investigate people who, for example, live 
near the crime scene or have stayed there. The same applies to mass sa-
liva tests and mass evaluation of cell phone data. Incorrectly suspected 
persons could also be exonerated immediately.
(own translation, advisory opinion, Association of 
German Criminal Investigators 2019)
Similarly to the Association of German Criminal Investigators, the German 
Judges’ Association supported the legislative initiative, assuming that it 
would advance the criminal investigation process overall. Based on the ref-
erence to proportionality, they argued that the case-by-case decision would 
help to ensure the proportionate application of FDP technologies:
The planned extension of the DNA analysis to determine the hair, eye 
and skin colour […] will open up new investigative approaches to in-
vestigate the crime, which will lead to a higher degree of crime investi-
gation. The measures are suitable for advancing the investigation and 
clarifying facts and are, therefore, also welcomed. It will also be en-
sured in the future that a proportionality test must also be carried out 
in each specific case.
(own translation, advisory opinion, Association of 
German Judges 2019)
We might be confronted here with what Cole (2013) detected in US judges’ 
favour for forensic science. He assumed that this might be driven by public 
safety concerns, which result in a view considering “forensic science as cru-
cial for protecting the public from crime” (Cole 2013, p. 42). Judges may also 
constitute an extremely receptive audience for forensic science in Germany 
as they favour an imaginary of the protected majority public over minority 
publics’ concerns.
As a third professional organisation, the German Bar Association’s expert 
opinion deserves a closer look. Different from the previous two professional 
organisations, it expresses a more sceptical view of the legislative proposal. 
The association did not articulate concerns about age determination but 
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considered the inference of the colour of eyes, hair and skin as a dispro-
portionate examination of the coding region of the genome. Thereby, it ac-
knowledges the common legal ground as established in the 2008 judgment 
of the European Court of Human Rights on the so-called “S. and Marper” 
case. The latter draws the line between the coding and non-coding or “un-
informative” regions of the genome and requires the consideration of the 
principle of proportionality when sampling, profiling and storing DNA 
profiles with respective information (Wienroth et al. 2014). The association 
raised concerns with regards to the threats to the fundamental right to in-
formational self-determination when information regarding the genetically 
defined outer appearance would be at stake. The determination and storage 
of these DNA identification patterns, it understood as interfering with this 
fundamental right:
The external features that the investigation is to cover are readily visible 
to everyone, which is why the project could be considered unproblem-
atic. However, the problem lies with the material and how the infor-
mation is obtained – not just by looking. The examination of coding 
regions of the DNA molecule for certain features of the appearance of 
a person would be breaking a taboo. So far, the requirements of the 
constitutional requirements have been met by the fact that the inves-
tigations have been limited to non-coding sections. It is known today 
that information can also be read from non-coding sections (such as 
diseases), but it is the coding sections that lead to the “transparent hu-
man being.” If the taboo breach is to be proportionate (= necessary) 
and, thus, legally permissible, it must be offset by substantial income for 
the investigative work. However, there can be no question of that: there 
is practically no yield at all.
(own translation, advisory opinion, German Bar Association 2019)
While the German Judges’ Association does not mention potential issues 
of discrimination of minorities, the German Bar Association speaks of a 
minority in the context of the assumed missing investigative value – which 
follows the rationale of the forensic culture the association is embedded in – 
of targeting “phenotypical minorities” with FDP technologies. Thereby, in-
directly, the proportionality of the impact on “phenotypical minorities” oc-
curs as an issue, without explicitly addressing the potential discriminatory 
risk of FDP technologies.
These three opinions of professional organisations presented above, al-
though differing with regards to their supportive or sceptic standpoint, all 
share two logics of referencing value systems in their ways of reasoning to 
establish their expert viewpoints: legalistic value sets and criminal inves-
tigative value sets. Legalistic value sets include general principles of law 
such as the proportionality principle, civil rights such as the informational 
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self-determination and privacy. Criminal investigative value sets assemble 
efficiency/speed and efficacy of the criminal investigation process and the 
value of investigative leads.
The argument that FDP technologies also could help exonerate otherwise 
suspicious persons deserves further reflection. Most actors in the criminal 
justice system agree that FDP technologies are most effective if they distin-
guish major collectives of shared characteristics from minor collectives of 
shared characteristics. Thus, the ontological premises driving imaginaries of 
affected publics of actors in the criminal justice system segregate along the 
categories of suspicious and non-suspicious population groups, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, however, the separation of imagined affected pub-
lics along outer appearance distinguishes between phenotypic majority and 
minority groups. The latent semantic structure in those arguments goes along 
the normalisation of typifying population groups along with their outer ap-
pearance, also because it is assumed to be already a given practice with other 
forensic measures. Taken-for-granted examples are interviewing eyewitnesses 
or photographs that are considered legitimate forms of forensic evidence. 
When reflecting on the right of informational self-determination and privacy, 
opinions diverge and the racist discriminatory potential tends to remain as-
sumed to be absent in the first two opinions, or to be of a slippery nature and 
what M’Charek et al. (2014) have called an “absent present” in particular in 
the last opinion, appearing on the surface and then hiding underground.
Arguments from experience, what Jasanoff (2017) called “views from 
somewhere,” likewise carried some weight in the policy debate. On the one 
hand, victims of crime, e.g., represented by the organisation Weisser Ring, 
expressed their support for the regulation of FDP (Weisser Ring 2019). 
On the other hand, those exposed to discrimination, like people belong-
ing to “minority groups,” expressed critiques about the planned regulation 
through their organisation of representation, the Central Council of Ger-
man Sinti and Roma. They have pointed to the practical use of FDP tech-
nologies, which, in their view, puts minority groups under the spotlight of 
criminal investigation:
Examinations of DNA material for external characteristics of trace ma-
terial, which is secured at a crime scene, cannot give valid conclusions 
for the identification of suspects, but focuses on minorities with certain 
characteristics in the investigation. DNA phenotyping, as it is now sup-
posed to be enshrined in law, discriminates, particularly against mi-
norities. This is because only minority members have a higher – only 
statistical – probability of identifying a particular genetic trait, whereas 
genetic traits of the majority population are inherent in almost all mem-
bers of the majority.
(Own translation, advisory opinion, Central 
Council of Sinti and Roma 2019)
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The issue of a potential threat to the protection of personal integrity, ei-
ther in the form of the right to privacy or prevention of discrimination of 
minority groups has found diverse supporters across different standpoints. 
The “viewpoints from somewhere” in this case are so diverse as to represent 
victims of crime as well as minority groups that potentially could become 
suspect populations. While the former is in favour of expansive measures for 
punitive reasons and to protect victims of crime in the most extensive forms, 
the latter problematises the measures that shift the focus of criminal investi-
gation with higher probabilities to minorities due to their own lived experi-
ence of structural discrimination, including the type displayed by the police. 
What both viewpoints have in common is that they built their opinions on – 
albeit different – imaginaries of marginalised and neglected affected pub-
lics, stressing specific experienced and potential harms and injuries. The lat-
ter builds on the distinction of phenotypic majority versus minority groups, 
and this collides with the minority group, which is, by historical experience, 
structurally confronted with racial discrimination. The additional distinc-
tion that the last opinion emphasises goes beyond the phenotypic minority 
and majority distinction in the way that it fears harm based on the distinc-
tion of genetic characteristics of minorities versus genetic characteristics of 
the majority.
The various views in this section assemble different implicit imaginaries 
of affected publics. A central observation deriving from this analysis is that 
the present imaginaries constitute dichotomies of affected publics, ranging 
from (1) suspicious versus non-suspicious population groups, (2) majority 
populations to be protected from crime versus minority populations whose 
civil rights might be suspended if that is in line with the proportionality 
principle to investigate crimes, (3) phenotypic majority populations versus 
phenotypic minority populations, (4) a majority population that has not ex-
perienced specific harm versus a minority population that has experienced 
specific injures (as victims of crime, experiences of structural discrimina-
tion, etc.) and (5) majority populations with shared genetic traits versus 
minority populations with specific genetic traits. This collection of binary 
dichotomies is the outset to advance the analysis of the politics of (non)be-
longing that enact specific boundaries and distinctions to imagine belong-
ing versus non-belonging affected publics.
Politics of (non)belonging and enacting 
imaginaries of affected publics
Yuval-Davis (2006) referred to the boundary-making, which the politics of 
(non)belonging constitute in the political community of belonging, as the 
boundaries that separate the world population into “us” and “them.” To 
better understand these forms of boundary-making and segregating popu-
lation groups and how boundaries materialise in specific ways, I focus in this 
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subsection on forms of assigning non-belonging and disadvantage to spe-
cific minorities, which easily may coincide with prejudices against racial and 
ethnic minorities. Ruha Benjamin (2019) has problematised technological 
designs as discriminatory, which confirm social divisions along previously 
existing segregation lines. In this part of the analysis, I investigate stake-
holder views provided in interviews to explore, in the sense of Benjamin, 
forms of enacting specific imaginaries of affected publics, in alienation from 
others, on the one hand, and as the accumulation of different –  partially 
pre-existing – segregating boundaries between affected publics, on the other 
hand.
The first form of the politics of (non)belonging I will explore here is about 
the media’s and policymakers’ framing and creating entry points that invite 
science to answer specific framed problems with technologies. As Jong and 
M’Charek (2017) have suggested, crime cases can be “fire objects,” which, 
through their travel through media, reveal presences and absences of issues. 
Here, I likewise find in the analysis that criminal cases can invoke differ-
ently (in)visibilities, but their relevance is in particular about the timing and 
framing of a problem in which a regulatory solution is presented as the ade-
quate fit for resolution. Furthermore, it illustrates how different imaginaries 
of affected publics overlap with each other and coincide with previously 
existing boundaries of (non)belonging and social exclusion. Framing a prob-
lem to fit a policy solution is known in policy studies. Kingdon (1984, 215) 
observed, “[A]dvocacy of solutions often precedes the highlighting of prob-
lems to which they are attached.” The first quotation relates to the momen-
tum when the Freiburg murder case served as a reference to frame a problem 
deeply entangled with the so-called migration crisis in Germany. FDP then 
is suggested as a solution for a setting involving a suspicious migrant, a 
member of a minority group with distinct external visible characteristics:
I think the general public – in Germany you can say that the police are 
very much making use of highlighting crime cases. There have been two 
criminal cases in Southern Germany, in Freiburg, at the end of 2016 
where two young women were murdered, and these cases were different 
from another which was not known at the beginning. So, it then came 
out one was a migrant and the other one was a truck driver who was 
operating in that area. So, one was an asylum seeker, one was a truck 
driver, who randomly attacked and killed young women after raping 
them. And so – and there was kind of hysteria in the population be-
cause it was – everybody was like guessing that with the first murder this 
was a migrant and then the second murder happened and he’s operating 
everywhere, we have to stop him. And then the police came with the 
idea of like DNA phenotyping and then the people were thinking like, 
yeah, this could be the idea to solve it.
(O04)
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The quotation on the Freiburg murder case illustrates how the search for 
suspicious population groups mobilised certain types and lines of knowl-
edge that coincided with pre-existing resentment against migrants and 
the idea of an effective forensic tool to better protect the wider public in 
the future, while other types of knowledges were strategically ignored. The 
particular way in which pre-existing segregation lines were confirmed 
rendered the framing of a problem in a way that the FDP technologies 
presented the specific solution. As the “problem” already built on two us/
them dichotomies (non-suspicious population versus suspicious popu-
lation group; majority non-migrant versus minority migrant groups) the 
“solution” then corresponded to those segregation lines. Manifesting the 
belonging/non-belonging distinction, the “solution” presented a technol-
ogy that can distinguish between phenotypic majority and minority pop-
ulation groups.
The following quotation portrays how spectacular crime cases, its media 
representation and imagined public expectations push policymakers to act:
And then, of course, which in Germany, of course, always influences 
or shapes criminal policy very strongly, is ultimately spectacular indi-
vidual cases or at least cases that are perceived as spectacular by the 
public. In this area, I see classic sexual offenses, where I usually have 
DNA of the offender but maybe not the culprit. But of course, if one had 
the opportunity to identify or find the perpetrator of the DNA left by 
the perpetrator, then of course this is always an approach where politi-
cians are more or less forced by public opinion, then to allow police and 
prosecutors to have this opportunity. […] And so I think these are cer-
tainly also factors that affect the politicians and then subsequently the 
ministry administrations, that there are simply inquiries from the press 
or press coverage that you have to do something against such horrible 
individual cases and that one then uses everything and there is the DNA 
as one of many investigative possibilities.
(O14)
The criminal case is perceived to serve as the inciting incident to perform 
advocacy for a specific law enforcement policy response. Crime cases are 
understood to support a policy dramaturgy of urgency with regards to the 
temporal correspondence between matching a solution to a problem. By 
chasing the “problem,” the initial situation gets framed in a particular way – 
collective stigmatisation of all people deemed to fit racialised notions of 
group similarity to a suspect (Toom et al. 2016; Skinner 2018) – to fit the 
solution, regardless of the complex nature of the problem to which the tech-
nological solution might be applied. Promoters of specific policy/technology 
solutions then present them as a “technological fix” but, in doing so, chasing 
their problems to legitimise the solution. As I have shown here, the first form 
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of the politics of (non)belonging deals with the enactment and reinforce-
ment of racialising and stigmatising imaginaries of suspect populations that 
derive from media representations of a criminal case and regulatory reper-
cussions proposing FDP technologies. FDP technologies thereby become 
charged with the meaning of having the potential to become technologies 
of (non)belonging.
The second form of the politics of (non)belonging is about experiences 
and knowledge of racialising and stigmatising cultural repertoires in polic-
ing and how these could contribute to enacting FDP technologies in ways 
that coincide with pre-existing segregation lines that affect minority groups 
in particular. The selected interviewee’s quotations assemble views from 
stakeholders with different viewpoint’s, concerned and working with data 
protection and forensic genetics. Concerns articulated by the interviewees 
range from “racial profiling” to “institutional racism” through the police, 
which all relate to over-policing members of minorities and putting them 
under greater surveillance (Skinner 2018, p. 12). The interviewee explains 
their concerns by differentiating between the genetic information (below the 
body’s surface) and the “external appearance” (above the body’s surface). 
The risk of discrimination is assumed to be linked with the mobilising of 
prejudice associated with outer appearance. Thus, the body as an object to 
the technology reveals the code for the phenotypic information that could 
transform into the risk of becoming a target of “racial profiling”:
What I believe is a recurring motive is, on the one hand, this possibility 
of discrimination based on genetic information, what is then perhaps 
called racial profiling or discrimination based on external appearance. 
And I also believe the fear that this technology will be used, so to speak, 
in everyday life for everyday small crimes. That would also be a point 
where I share these concerns.
(O10)
The following interviewee argues that probability assessments involved in 
FDP technologies would not be a major problem for the police, as uncer-
tainties are part of other tools of criminal investigation as well:
So, probability statements are a completely normal standard in police 
investigations. When we are dealing with a radio cell query or who 
knows what, there are references to a perpetrator or an act or a victim 
everywhere and these are not 100% reliable indications but are indica-
tions associated with a certain degree of uncertainty. So, in this respect 
it is nothing special, the special thing is that the criminal investigation 
authorities do not yet have the experience [to work with FDP technol-
ogies], i.e., can effectively assess this, that is one point. And then there 
are certain risks of discrimination, the second problem is that very 
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specific social prejudices, which of course are also represented in the 
police, then have an impact on these investigations because they will 
be reinforced.
(O07)
Rather, what turns out to be a problem, according to the interviewee, is the 
insufficient experience with a probability prediction of phenotypic informa-
tion based on genetic technology. The interviewee assumes that resentments 
and stigmatisation of phenotypic minority population groups deemed crim-
inal could drive the use of FDP technologies in the criminal investigation. 
In this scenario, FDP technologies would “provide points of stabilization 
that enable the enactment of difference and belonging and the exploitation 
of group differences” (Skinner 2018, p. 18). Reflecting on a history of single, 
publicly documented cases of police racism the interviewee problematises 
the lack of scientific research on the institutional racism of the police:2
The other issue is that there are currently many open questions about 
institutional racism in everyday police practice in Germany. And there 
are many examples, unfortunately in Germany, […] there is no, so to 
speak, scientifically recognized general research that provides a state 
of the art, but there is much criticism of many individual measures and 
the basic attitude too and that can be illustrated with many, many, very 
many examples. I agree. And that’s why we are against this differenti-
ated prediction of DNA.
(O03)
The interviewee is concerned with the potential of institutional racism, 
which may turn FDP technologies into an instrument reinforcing segrega-
tion lines that could “over-police” phenotypic and genetic minorities and 
exponentiate the risk of discrimination. Yuval-Davis stated that “politics 
of belonging comprise specific political projects aimed at construction be-
longing to particular collectivity/ies, which are themselves being assembled 
in these projects, within specified boundaries” (Yuval-Davis et al. 2018, p. 
230). While the inference of biogeographic ancestry was not included in 
the federal legislation on FDP, concerns empathising with the “views from 
somewhere,” regarding the discriminatory potential of the remaining FDP 
technologies predicting hair, eye and skin colour have been marginalised 
in the regulatory debate. This guides me to reflect on how actors involved 
in the politics of non-belonging together co-constitute specific imaginaries 
of affected publics, which reinforce existing social divisions disadvantaging 
specific minority groups as “non-belonging.” Weber (2020, p. 71) has sug-
gested that the police, in conjunction with other social actors and institu-
tions, may act with discriminatory policing “as potentially powerful agents 
of ‘governmental belonging.’” While the media, together with policymakers, 
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de facto mobilised and used racialising fears against minorities to promote 
FDP technologies, those imaginaries of suspect populations have been more 
dominantly reinforced in the regulatory debate. Instead, concerns raised 
by some stakeholder interviewees about the police enforcing pre-existing 
resentments and harming minority groups once they used FDP technolo-
gies in practice have remained disregarded. FDP technologies, in one way 
or another, remain meaningfully charged with dichotomies of imaginaries 
of affected publics, benefitting the racialised reading of either suspicious 
minority population groups, or of overpoliced and discriminated minority 
groups.
Conclusion
This chapter took Jasanoff’s approach of differentiated regimes of sight 
as an inspiration to portray controversial issues such as the potential risks 
linked with the regulation of FDP technologies in Germany from different 
viewpoints, explaining them from their contingent modes of knowing. With 
this chapter, I aimed to answer the questions: What are different modes of 
knowing the consequences of FDP technologies for imaginaries of the af-
fected publics? Whose knowing and viewpoint count, under which rules of 
the game and what gets relegated to the margins of invisibility and inaction?
Exploring the different viewpoints on FDP technologies – views from no-
where, views from everywhere and views from somewhere – not only illus-
trates the relevance of all three stylised regimes in the context of forensic 
technologies and criminal justice policies of envisioning information pro-
duced by FDP technologies, but also helps highlight the value commitments 
involved in each, which influence how affected publics are imagined and 
distinguished. Taking a closer look at the different viewpoints articulated 
throughout the regulatory process, we were confronted with enacted multi-
ple imaginaries of affected publics. More precisely, the different standpoints 
assembled here have in common segregated and often binary divisions over 
affected publics. Furthermore, this analytical distinction brings into per-
spective the marginalised views concerned with discrimination and racism 
that were not incorporated into the final political considerations of FDP 
and legal decision-making in Germany.
The analysis demonstrated how some epistemic regimes dominated the 
public discourse, which attributed epistemic authority to the expertise and 
legitimising discourses and practices of specific forensic scientific and spe-
cific criminal justice stakeholder expertise. Thereby, the epistemic authority 
of the subjective views of knowing was hardly recognised. Knowing through 
experience and personal exposure to structural discrimination falls together 
with being potentially affected by a higher probability of FDP’s risk of dis-
crimination. Furthermore, the analysis reveals the politics of seeing, know-
ing, and imagining (non)-belonging publics affected by FDP. Finally, the 
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analysis reveals how specific modes of knowing and imagining affected pub-
lics are prioritised over others through specific forms of politics: (a) enacting 
FDP technologies as a solution to racialised framings of political problems, 
and (b) marginalising subjective modes of knowing, which emphasise the 
potential harm of FDP technologies, based on pre-existing experiences of 
discrimination.
The politics of (non)belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006) are here embedded 
in a series of prior assumptions and value commitments that affect what 
we know, how we put knowledge to work in assuming technologies’ con-
sequences and, in turn, how we imagine affected publics. Racialised dis-
criminatory practices may be applied in the context of FDP technologies 
following imaginaries of targeted/affected publics. Thereby, such practices 
may reinforce boundaries of pre-existing social divisions segregating sus-
picious, phenotypic, genetic minority groups by agents being part of an ar-
rangement of actors together exercising “governmental belonging” against 
“non-belonging” publics.3
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Notes
 1 For the notion of imaginaires, I take inspiration from Yaron Ezrahi who prom-
inently stated: “The structure of the political order is always in a process of be-
coming, of dialectical and ambiguous relations to the imaginaries that sustain it 
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and to the actual or potential imaginaries that subvert it” (Ezrahi 2012: 4). Ezra-
hi’s political imaginaries – and imaginaries of affected publics are variations of 
them – and their performative power to produce social and political facts is key 
to understanding the relevance of exploring the imaginaries of segregated af-
fected publics. Such imaginaries appear as “fictions, metaphors, ideas, images, 
or conceptions” (Ezrahi 2012: 3), but are composed and may be negotiated, and 
be enacted through FDP technologies.
 2 In Germany’s recent history, the so-called case of the “Phantom of Heilbronn” 
(Samuel & Prainsack 2019, p. 32), illustrates a prominent example of ambigu-
ous trust relationship with forensic genetic technologies in the country and the 
seemingly racial sensitivities in Germany’s criminal justice system and in wider 
public perceptions (Samuel & Prainsack 2019, p. 32). The case demonstrated 
the problematic entanglement of the media, the institutional prejudice of in-
vestigators and forensic DNA-based investigation methods in the construction 
of high-profile crime cases (Lipphardt 2018; Samuel & Prainsack 2019). In the 
“Phantom of Heilbronn” case, following a series of murders in Heilbronn in 
2007, the DNA from the same person was linked to 40 crimes perpetrated be-
tween 1993 and 2009 in several countries including Germany. The DNA anal-
ysis suggested that the suspect was an Eastern European female, and criminal 
investigators took this as implicating the Sinti and Roma community (Samuel & 
Prainsack 2019, p. 32). After acknowledging a case of DNA contamination 
caused by a Polish factory worker packaging cotton swabs that were then used 
in different forensic labs across Europe for the investigation of crime-scene 
stains, in 2012, the Minister of the Interior for the German Federal State of 
Baden-Württemberg apologised to the Sinti and Roma community for the po-
lice’s bungled interpretation of DNA evidence after the Heilbronn murders 
(Lipphardt et al. 2016). The case revealed the “potential for over-investment in 
or misunderstanding of test results in the context of existing stigmatisation of 
minority groups” (Skinner 2018, p. 4). Overall, the trust in the technologies itself 
was less affected than the trust in criminal justice actors applying them.
 3 In the author’s view, reducing the risk of discrimination against minorities in a 
structurally racist society, the (probabilistic) prediction of skin color can lead 
to discrimination, as can statements about the likely biogeographical origin of 
the person. To ensure the responsible handling of this type of information in 
the context of criminal investigations, far-reaching measures are required to 
effectively counteract the risk of discriminatory use. Measures should include 
the systematic evaluation of the effects of the extended DNA analysis on the 
actual detection rate of crimes as well as on the rights and interests of indi-
viduals and groups of people (especially minorities in society). Additionally, 
possibilities for systematic and democratic and civil society control should be 
installed. Intensive training of the professionals using the informative value 
of the extended DNA analysis is required. To date, there has been no suffi-
cient democratic and civil society control of the application of the technology 
installed.
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